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Unconstitutionally Male?:
The Story of United States v. Virginia
Katharine T. Bartlett

*

In 1989, a northern Virginia female high school student complained to the U.S.
Department of Justice that the Virginia Military Institute (“VMI”) did not accept applications from women. Seven years later, in United States v. Virginia,1 the U.S. Supreme
Court vindicated her complaint, holding that VMI’s exclusion of women was unconstitutional, even after Virginia attempted to save the male-only school by adding a parallel
program for women at a neighboring all-women’s college. The story of this case and its
aftermath exhibits both the muscle of sex discrimination doctrine and its unresolved tensions.
The record in United States v. Virginia does not reflect what drew this anonymous
applicant to the 150-year-old college. VMI has a reputation for rigorous academics, especially in its engineering and science programs. It is also known for a military-style culture and regimen, and especially for its unique, “adversative” system of education, which
combines tortuous “[p]hysical rigor, mental stress, . . . minute regulation of behavior, and
indoctrination of values.”2 A new cadet enters VMI as a “rat,” defined in the “Rat Bible”
as the “dumbest and lowliest of God’s creatures.3 Rats are put through seven months of
the “rat line,” a deliberately overwhelming physical and mental leveling process designed
to humiliate and disorient the student, instill self-doubt, and strip away any sense of indi-
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documentary on the VMI case as part of the American Law Documentary Series, and Amelia Ashton for
superb research assistance.

1

United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).

2

United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 892–93 (4th Cir. 1992).

3

The Rat Bible, formally known as The Bullet, is a compendium of basic facts about VMI—its history,
layout, calendar, student government, and colloquial terms and abbreviations. It is prepared by the senior
class and must be memorized in its entirety, and carried by each rat at all times. See, e.g., The Bullet: The
Rat Bible for the Rat Mass of the Virginia Military Institute (Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, VA),
1997–1998 (on file with VMI Archives, Preston Library, Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, Va.); See
also Philippi Strum, Women in the Barracks: The VMI Case and Equal Rights 39 (2002).

THE STORY OF UNITED STATES v. VIRGINIA

viduality, favor, or privilege.4 Out of this experience come graduates who are confident
and extraordinarily loyal to the school. VMI alumni are leaders in their communities and
disproportionately influential in the state of Virginia.5
Like the men who sought admission to VMI, the would-be female applicant may
have been hungry for the intensity of the physical and mental challenge and the leadership opportunities. She may have longed for membership in a tightly knit community,
bonded through the shared grueling misery VMI experience.6 Like others who had succeeded at VMI, she may have had proud family members who attended VMI or been a
troublesome under-achiever who had squandered other opportunities.7
The VMI story is about the battle between the federal government seeking to gain
access for an unknown number of women8 to a school that deliberately excluded them.
From the government’s perspective, the VMI litigation was part of a long, ongoing effort to
eliminate sex distinctions and gender stereotypes from laws and public institutions. The
government did not expect that many women would ever attend VMI. In this sense, as one
commentator has written, “the continued existence of an all-male military school in Virginia may have been more significant for its expressive effects than for the actual deprivation of educational opportunities.”9 The federal government viewed the principle of equal
treatment as a means of transforming how society viewed and treated women and thus as a
principle worth continuing to extend. In addition, the case looked winnable. As one law-

4

See Statement of Elmon T. Gray, May 5, 1989, available from VMI Archives, supra note 3, at 3. [see
memo]
5

Strum, supra note 3, at 89. There were 6 ,000 VMI alumni in 1989, which included “two congressmen,
two state senators, the former speaker of the House of Delegates, the managing partners of the state’s two
biggest law firms, and numerous industrialists and investors.” Id.
6

See Laura Fairchild Brodie, VMI and the Coming of Women 42 (2001) (describing VMI’s “mixture of
bonding and bondage”).
7

A case in point is the superintendent of VMI (analogous to the president at most colleges and universities) just before and during gender integration, General Josiah Bunting. Bunting had been a serious discipline problem in high school, who was thrown out of one boarding school after another before finding a
school that would let him sit for his final exams. He took to VMI as a student and went on to be one of its
most successful graduates—a Rhodes Scholar, president of Briarcliff College (an all-female school in New
York) and Hampden-Sydney College (an all-male college in Virginia), and headmaster of the prestigious
Lawrenceville Academy in New Jersey where he oversaw the successful introduction of women to the previously all-male preparatory school. See John Sedgwick, Guess Who’s Coming to VMI?, Gentleman’s
Quarterly, July, 1997, at 124; Brodie, supra note 6, at 34; Strum, supra note 3, at 36–39, 101.
8

The record reveals that 347 women made inquiries about VMI in the two years preceding the lawsuit.
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 523 (1996).
9

See Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 Harv.
L. Rev. 4, 74 (1996).
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yer who participated in the litigation later put it, “Although VMI’s admission policy might
have seemed like a small fish, at least it looked liked one that could be shot in a barrel.”10
If the government’s case for the gender integration of VMI was symbolic, lacking
even a specific named victim or a known set of beneficiaries,11 VMI’s case to keep women
out could not have been more concrete. The school was a success story, steeped in rich
traditions. Its distinct, holistic teaching philosophy had specific regimens and rituals designed to replace individual ego with an earned sense of accomplishment and group loyalty. It took young men, cut them down, and built them back up as leaders. Its graduates
believed fiercely that the presence of the few women who could survive the VMI experience would destroy it, and they were prepared to fight hard to preserve that priceless institution. The federal government’s interference on behalf of some hypothetical women, for
these advocates, demonstrated “politically-correct” contempt for a proven educational system and an honorable way of life.12
Over the course of the litigation, the struggle between these two world views mirrored the multiple versions of equality that have animated debates over sex discrimination
law:
(1) Exclusion of women based on their differences. Virginia’s original justification for excluding women from VMI was that women fundamentally differ from men and
thus that their admission to VMI would ruin the school for men without benefiting women themselves. The district court followed this rationale in holding that VMI did not need
to admit women.
(2) Separate but equal. The district court’s decision in support of Virginia’s position was reversed on appeal, on the ground that it was unconstitutional for Virginia to
make the unique VMI opportunity available only to men. Thereafter, VMI worked with
Mary Baldwin College to develop a parallel, all-female institution with the same general

10

Cornelia T.L. Pillard, United States v. Virginia: The Virginia Military Institute, Where the Men and Men
(and so are the Women), in Civil Rights Stories 265, 266 (Myriam E. Gilles & Risa L. Goluboff eds.,
2008).
11

On the significance of having a named plaintiff in the litigation challenging the exclusion of women
from The Citadel, see Valorie K. Vojdik, At War: Narrative Tactics in The Citadel and VMI Litigation, 19
Harv. Women’s L.J. 1 (1996).

12

See George H. Roberts Jr. (Executive Vice President of the VMI Foundation), Supreme Court to Hear
Case January 17, VMI Alumni Rev., Fall 1995, at 6, 8 (“To our opponents who choose to view themselves
as victims, VMI is an elevated symbol to be toppled regardless of its cost and without concern for the benefits never to be regained for the women and men for whom such distinctive educations have been forever
changed.”); see also Interview with Major General Josiah Bunting III, in Princeton, N.J. (June 11, 2008)
(explaining his view that a culture that had achieved such a high level of efficiency and proven success
should not have been put at risk); Strum, supra note 3, at 131 (“Partisans of an all-male VMI considered the
idea of a gender-integrated military institute to be the reflection of laughable notions about women’s equality.”).
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purpose as VMI. The concept for separate but equal single-sex institutions was approved
by both the district court and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
(3) Assimilation based on women’s similarities to men. The United States argued,
and the Supreme Court ultimately held, that VMI’s exclusion of women was based on
gender stereotypes, that the two separate programs were not substantially equal, and thus
that the exclusion of women from VMI was unconstitutional.
(4) Accommodation to women’s differences. Although the United States had insisted during the litigation that the admission of women would not require any significant
changes to VMI, once the process of women’s assimilation began, the United States
sought modifications to the VMI program to enable women to obtain equal benefit from a
VMI education.
(5) Unconstitutionally male. Another view of equality was not argued explicitly
by any party nor adopted by any court in the litigation, but glimpses of it emerged
throughout the litigation. This view saw beyond VMI’s exclusion of women to the problem that the “unique” methodology that defined this state-supported institution was
grounded in an ideology of male superiority. The assumption that women did not have
the strength, discipline, endurance, character, or loyalty to succeed at VMI was more than
an excuse not to admit them; it was a critical motivational component of VMI’s unique
adversative methodology. By this view of the case, the problem was less that women
were missing out on something than that the education available to men was based on a
fundamentally degraded and subordinated view of women.
This chapter traces the story of United States v. Virginia through the lenses offered by these different views of equality. It concludes that while the standard for evaluating VMI’s exclusion of women became more rigorous at each stage, the case remained
caught in a paradigm based on women’s right to have the opportunity to conform to existing institutions as long as it did not change them. Yet just below the surface, United
States v. Virginia raised unanswered questions about whether a state should be allowed to
fund an educational program defined by hyper-masculine norms. In proceeding as if preserving the institution was both possible and desirable, the parties and the courts failed to
confront the constitutional problems of a state-sponsored institution premised on the
principles of male superiority. As a result, the decision in the case opened VMI to
women, but it did nothing to address the degrading gender norms that defined the school.
In treating the problem of VMI as if it were solely about its single-sex admissions policy,
the case also failed to distinguish between VMI and other single-sex schools. As a result,
the decision failed to provide guidance to states and educators going forward about what
forms of single-sex education, if any, are constitutional.
The chapter analyzes these limitations, and suggests how a richer, more substantive view of equality might have made a difference.
I. The Virginia Military Institute
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Founded in 1839, the Virginia Military Institute initially imposed a military-style
training on raucous, undisciplined young men who had been gathered to guard an arsenal
of armaments left over from the War of 1812.13 From its inception, the school accepted
recalcitrant boys and used strict methods of military training to “draw out the man,” and
instill discipline and character.14 Its first superintendent, Francis H. Smith, wrote that
[m]any bad subjects were sent here to be reformed . . . . [W]e started with the idea
that we would admit such bad subjects, and try and see what could be done with
them. The military organization of the institution had a tendency to fascinate such
unruly spirits, who might be made valuable men by the military pride which promotion to the military offices of the school held out to them.15
VMI students studied the military sciences, as well as liberal arts, and engineering.16 Although at one point called the “West Point of the South,” VMI was not intended as a pipeline to professional military service; rather, its aim was the development
of well-disciplined citizen-soldiers who could be leaders in their communities, ready to
come to their country’s defense if necessary.17 In its early decades, it produced primarily
school teachers and engineers;18 in recent years, 43% of its graduates accept military
commissions,19 but only about 15% of its graduates make a full career of military service.20 In addition to support from the state of Virginia,21 VMI receives substantial private contributions from its alumni, making it the best endowed public undergraduate
institution in the United States on a per-student basis.22
13

VMI historians describe the men as “an undesirable element in the social economy of aristocratic Lexington” who were lacking in self-discipline and engaged in leisure-time antics that were both distasteful
and threatening to the townspeople. Jennings C. Wise, The Military History of the Virginia Military Institute from 1939 to 1865, at 31 (1915); Henry A. Wise, Drawing Out the Man: The VMI Story 11 (1978);
Strum, supra note 3, at 9, 12 (2002).

14

Henry A. Wise, supra note 13.

15

Francis H. Smith, The Virginia Military Institute, Its Building and Rebuilding 242 (1912), quoted in
Strum, supra note 3, at 11 (emphasis in original).
16

VMI was the first school in the South to teach engineering and industrial chemistry, and engineering
became one of its core specialties. See Strum, supra note 3, at 12.

17

Id. at 12–13.

18

Id. at 14 (citing Col. William Couper, 1 One Hundred Years at V.M.I. 34–35 (1939)). [see
memo][DONE]

19

Jay Conley, Just Like the Guys, Roanoke Times, Aug. 12, 2007, at A1.

20

United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1432 (W.D. Va. 1991).

21

In representing the United States before the Supreme Court, Paul Bender stated that in the 1989–1990
academic year, the state of Virginia contributed about $10 million to VMI, or about 35% of the school’s
budget. Transcript of Oral Argument at 1–2, United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (Nos. 94-1941, 942107).

22

Virginia, 518 U.S. at 552.
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VMI has been described as “deliberately anachronistic.”23 Although not technically a military academy, cadets dress in uniforms similar to those worn by the original
cadets and they drill and march to and from class.24 Several times a day, as they enter the
courtyard of the “post” from the barracks, they salute the larger-than-life statute of
Stonewall Jackson, a Civil War hero and early VMI professor.25 Year after year, the cadets commemorate Jackson and other VMI standard-bearers, such as World War II General George C. Marshall, VMI Class of 1901.26 They also celebrate the Civil War Battle
of New Market, at which a brave band of 241 young men from VMI (some as young as
fifteen) marched eighty-four miles to battle and turned back Union forces. Ten VMI cadets died in the battle and forty-seven were wounded in the service of the Confederacy
that day. VMI marks their sacrifices with an annual re-enactment of the battle; a battle
streamer hanging from VMI’s regimental colors; an enormous painting of the event in
VMI’s Jackson Hall; and a tomb of six of the slain soldiers which lies beneath a statue,
Virginia Bearing Her Dead, bearing the names of all the New Market cadets who fought
in the battle.27
Cadets live in Spartan conditions, three to five to a room, with no carpets, door
locks, telephones, wall hangings, television sets, or air-conditioning. With classes, military drills, and conditioning exercises, days are tightly scheduled from 6:30 am through
lights out at 11 p.m.28 A strict, student-enforced honor code commands that students not
“lie, cheat, steal, nor tolerate those who do.” For even the most minor violation of this
code, the single penalty is expulsion.29

23
24

Brodie, supra note 6, at xi.
Strum, supra note 3, at 13.

25

Further indication of the reverence in which Jackson is held is the mounting of the hide of Jackson’s
horse, Little Sorrell, in the museum located at the lower level of the main building on the campus, Jackson
Hall. See Brodie, supra note 6, at 6–8.

26

Visitor Guide, Welcome to Virginia Military Institute (rev’d Feb. 2008).

27

Strum, supra note 3, at 19–20. The VMI Visitor Guide, “Welcome to Virginia Military Institute” (rev’d
Feb. 2008) boasts that the 1864 battle was “the only time in American history that an entire college student
body engaged in pitched battle as a single unit.” The painting of the Battle of New Market is by Benjamin
West Clinedinst, VMI Class of 1880; it is displayed prominently in the front of Jackson Memorial Hall.
Brodie, supra note 6, at 3–6. The statue of Virginia Mourning Her Dead is by Moses Ezekiel, also an
alumnus. The re-enactment ceremony takes take each fall; the rats’ first formal duty involves traveling to
New Market to parade through the streets and, afterward, to gather at VMI’s Hall of Valor, a museum on
the battlefield, where they learn about the events at New Market from upper-class re-enactors, and then,
finally, stage their own charge across the battlefield. Id. at 6–7. The deaths of the ten New Market soldiers
are honored at the end of each year, with a review parade and a placing of wreaths on the graves of the six
cadets who are buried at the foot of Virginia Mourning Her Dead. Id. at 7.
28

See Strum, supra note 3, at 43–45; United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1421–22 (W.D. Va.
1991); United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 894 (4th Cir. 1992).

29

Virginia, 976 F.2d at 894.
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The small college in western Virginia is home to about 1,300 students. For six
consecutive years, U.S. News & World Report has ranked the school first, among the
twenty-seven other public liberal arts colleges in the nation.30 While the school is ultimately subject to control of the Virginia General Assembly, it is governed by a Board of
Visitors, which is charged by state law with prescribing “the terms upon which cadets
may be admitted, their number, the course of instruction, the nature of their service, and
the duration thereof.”31
VMI had always excluded women from admission as students.32 The exclusion of
women, however, does not fully capture the maleness of the institution as it existed in
1989. The adversative system, which defined the essence of the institution,33 was deliberately and pervasively gendered. Its design was to create leaders by giving them nearimpossible challenges, and then equating success in meeting those challenges to masculinity. Rat culture eschewed all things female, except as objects of derision and humiliation. Sexual references saturated the VMI “official” vocabulary. Among the definitions
every cadet must learn from the Rat Bible are to “bone,” or report someone for a violation; to “bust,” or reduce in rank; and “running a period,” or going twenty-eight days
without a demerit.34
The gendered nature of VMI method was especially apparent in the institution of
the rat line. The rat line tested the mettle of the entering rats by making them completely
subservient to the largely unsupervised upper-class cadets, who ordered the rats to do
push-ups and run laps to the point of total exhaustion, “strain,”35 run errands at all hours,
and recite from memory portions of the Rat Bible. To reinforce the machismo ethos,
gendered obscenities and hostility toward women served as quasi-official motivational

30

Virginia Military Institute, VMI: VMI Again Ranked No. 1 Public Liberal Arts College In U.S., Aug. 18,
2006, at http://new.vmi.edu/show.asp?durki=7803.

31

Va. Code Ann. §§ 23-92 to 23-104 (2006). VMI is supervised, like the other fifteen state-supported colleges and universities in Virginia, by the state’s Council of Higher Education. Va. Code Ann. § 23-9.6:1(2)
(2006). The Council delegates to each institution the right to modify its mission and to establish admissions criteria. Id.

32

Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1982 decision in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718 (1982), finding unconstitutional the exclusion of men from an all-female nursing school, VMI
reexamined its male-only admissions policy. After a nearly three-year study, a Mission Study Committee
appointed by the VMI Board of Visitors counseled against changing VMI’s all-male policy. See United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 539 (1996); Strum, supra note 3, at 31–33.
33

Virginia, 518 U.S. at 548–49 (citing district court); Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1423 (“[M]ost important
aspects of the VMI educational experience occur in the barracks.”).

34
35

The Bullet, supra note 3, at 73, 76.

To “strain” is to “rack in” one’s chin tightly into the neck, hold one’s arms stiffly, and push the chest far
forward, while remaining erect and at rigid attention. The Rat Bible describes it as “a position you will
practice most of the time as a Rat.” Id. at 77.
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techniques in the rat line.36 These coarse and demeaning characterizations of women as a
whole were paired with chivalrous standards of behavior toward particular women—
“ladies”—that both defined men’s protective role and reinforced the ideology of
women’s inequality.37
Each rat was assigned a senior-class mentor or “dyke,” 38 but the dyke was sometimes the rat’s most enthusiastic tormenter.39 Not until the end of the rat line in an infamous ritual known as “breakout” did the subordination subside. Breakout reacted the
brutality of the rat line. It began with the rats crawling together in waves across twentyfive to thirty yards of a cold, deep, mud quagmire and then up a steep, 40- to 50-degree
slick incline. As they tried to ascend the hill, upperclassmen kicked and pushed them
back, slathering mud into their eyes, ears, and mouth. Breakout finally ended, on cue,
with upperclassmen extending a helpful hand or foot, literally and symbolically, to help
the rats reach the top.40
The problem with admitting women to this environment was as much that they
might succeed at this manly challenge as that they would fail. As one researcher put it,

36

Susan Faludi described this type of culture at The Citadel, the South Carolina counterpart of VMI whose
exclusion of women was in litigation at the same time as the VMI lawsuit. See infra text accompanying
notes 44–48; Susan Faludi, The Naked Citadel, The New Yorker, Sept. 5, 1994, at 62; see also Valorie K.
Vojdik, Gender Outlaws: Challenging Masculinity in Traditionally Male Institutions, 17 Berkeley
Women’s L.J. 68, 98–99 (2002) (describing the culture of hyper-masculinity at The Citadel). One female
cadet, looking back on her experience at VMI, described one experience which captured the VMI culture
for her: “It really hit me once when I was watching TV with a group of guys . . . . It was a quiz show, and
whenever a woman came on, she was instantly characterized as a bitch, a slut or a dog.” Chris Kahn, VMI
Graduates 1st Female Class: The 13 Cadets Survived Taunts and Formed Bonds, Milwaukee J. Sentinel,
May 20, 2001, at A22 (internal quotation marks omitted).
37

Among the rules and expectations set forth in The Bullet, which rats must memorize, is The Code of a
Gentleman, which provides, among other things, that a Gentleman does not “speak more than casually
about his girl friend,” “go to a lady’s house if he is affected by alcohol,” “hail a lady from a club window,”
discuss “the merits or demerits of a lady,” or “so much as lay a finger on a lady.” Virginia, 518 U.S. at
602–03 (Scalia, J. dissenting).

38

“Dyke” is one of many terms at VMI that claim official meanings different from the sexualized meaning
more commonly associated with them. According to the Rat Bible, “dyke” means (a) “a combination of
your mother, father, and older brother; your First Class pal; and confidant; (b) a uniform, e.g., class dyke,
gym dyke, church dyke; (c) as a verb, to get dressed, especially for parade (‘dyke out’); (d) the insidious
white cross-belts in which a hapless Rat gets hopelessly entangled while trying to ‘Dyke out’ without help.”
The Bullet, supra note 3, at 74. For other terms in the VMI lexicon, see supra text accompanying notes 36
and infra text accompanying notes 225–226.
39

See Calvin R. Trice, VMI is Taking Stock: Mentoring, Honor System Face Reviews, Richmond TimesDispatch, Nov. 7, 2001, at B3; Philip Walzer, One ‘Rat’ is Now a Recruiter of Female Cadets to Virginia
Military Institute, Virginian-Pilot (Norfolk, VA), Dec. 3, 2004.

40

Strum, supra note 3, at 46–47; Brodie, supra note 6, at 312; Interview with Brig. Gen. Mike Bissell, in
Staunton, VA (June 12, 2008).
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“if women could perform well on [the rat line], how could it continue to function as evidence of manhood?”41
It was to this environment that the United States sought entry for women.
II. The Legal Challenge
A. United States and Virginia
The 1989 challenge to VMI initiated by the United States Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) was not the first legal complaint about VMI’s exclusion of women. A decade
earlier in 1979, a female VMI professor, Margaret Mason Seider, filed suit after she was
told her teaching contract would not be renewed. In addition to her cause of action for
wrongful discharge, she sought class-action status for females who might have wanted to
be students at VMI. Her claim was that “the total absence of female cadets creates an
ambiance and an atmosphere at VMI which makes it difficult, if not impossible, for a female professor . . . to participate fully in the life of VMI and pervades all aspects of the
institute.”42 Seider claimed that while at VMI, she was subject to harassment by cadets,
including obscene phone calls, open disrespect by cadets to her authority, and a vicious
cartoon directed against her in the cadet newspaper. Within a month, the suit settled by
confidential agreement.43
At the time of the anonymous 1989 complaint, VMI and South Carolina’s The
Citadel were the only state-supported, all-male colleges in the country.44 Subsequent litigation filed in 1993 against The Citadel by Shannon Faulkner led to an injunction by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, requiring The Citadel to admit
Faulkner to day classes while that lawsuit was pending.45 Faulkner dropped out of The
Citadel less than a week after she entered, “overcome by stress and terror as the only
woman alone in the barracks with 1800 male cadets, most of whom hated her guts.”46 The
district court later held that the denial of Faulkner’s admission violated her right to substan-

41

Strum, supra note 3, at 109.

42

Jen McCaffery & Matt Chittum, An Early Skirmish Over Admissions, Roanoke Times, Aug. 1, 2004, at
B1.

43

Id.

44

Strum, supra note 3, at 131.

45

Faulkner v. Jones, 10 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 1993) (affirming grant of preliminary injunction to Faulkner and
ordering her admitted to day classes).

46

Vojdik, Gender Outlaws, supra note 36, at 71. Poor physical conditioning was also a factor. Citadel’s
First Female Case Tells of the Stress of Her Court Fight, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1995, § 1, at 36 (Faulkner
was considerably overweight); see Diane H. Mazur, A Call to Arms, 22 Harv. Women’s L.J. 39, 76–77
(1999) (faulting Faulkner’s attorneys for not ensuring that she was more prepared to enter The Citadel, including being in good physical shape). Other women picked up the litigation after Faulkner left The Citadel. See Mellette v. Jones, 136 F.3d 342 (4th Cir. 1998).
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tially equal educational opportunities and ordered a remedial plan for the admission of
other women to be submitted.47 The matter was not finally resolved until the 1996 decision
of the United States Supreme Court in the VMI case, at which point The Citadel immediately began admitting women.48
As the VMI case began to unfold, neither the United States nor Virginia appeared
to be fully committed to the litigation. DOJ initiated this matter without consulting with
then-President George H.W. Bush.49 The lead lawyer, Judith Keith of the Civil Rights
Division,50 was personally invested in the case, but the division was understaffed51 and
the lawyering team lacked expertise.52 The Bush administration tied the department’s
hands on certain litigation claims, barring attorneys, for example, from conceding that
anything other than dorm rooms and bathrooms would have to change with women’s admission.53 In the appeals phase, DOJ was ordered not to communicate with the amici curiae or interested civil rights groups about the appeals strategy.54
As for Virginia, despite the enthusiasm of VMI alumni for remaining all-male,
many state officials and various state constituencies favored the admission of women to
the school. When first contacted by the DOJ in 1989, Governor Gerald L. Baliles tried to
persuade the VMI Board of Visitors to admit women.55 In response, and under fierce
pressure by many influential alumni and with the legal advice of former United States
Attorney General Griffin Bell, the VMI Board of Visitors affirmed its single-sex admissions policy.56 The lieutenant governor of the state and Democratic nominee for governor in 1989, L. Douglas Wilder, vacillated over the VMI issue, and the state attorney

47

Faulkner v. Jones, 858 F. Supp. 552 (D.S.C. 1994).

48

Strum, supra note 3, at 298.

49

Id. at 90.

50

Id. at 35.

51

Id. at 105–06.

52

Id. at 185-86.

53

Id. at 192. The discomfort of DOJ attorneys with this restriction was sometimes quite apparent. See
infra text accompanying notes 161–162.
54

Id. at 190.

55

In the letter, Governor Baliles stated that Virginia law did not preclude the admission of women to VMI
and that, furthermore, the “historic fact that VMI has never admitted a woman student does not justify the
continuance of that policy.” Letter from Gerald L. Baliles, Governor, Virginia, to Joseph M. Spivey, III,
President of the VMI Board of Visitors (Apr. 18, 1990) (on file with VMI Archives, Preston Library, Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, Va.).

56

Bell advised the Board that the admissions policy was “defensible” and that there was a “good chance”
that VMI’s all-male admissions policy would be upheld by the United States Supreme Court. Letter from
Joseph M. Spivey, III, to the Honorable Gerald L. Baliles (Apr. 19, 1989) (on file with VMI Archives, Preston Library, Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, Va.).
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general, Mary Sue Terry, put off giving an opinion.57 After Wilder became governor, the
district court forced him to take a stand, and he publicly came out in favor of admitting
women to VMI.58 At that point Terry withdrew from the case,59 with assurances to the
court that VMI’s board and alumni would be represented by private counsel. That counsel was the firm of McGuire, Woods, Battle and Boothe, led by Robert H. Patterson, Jr., a
loyal member of the VMI Class of 1949.60
Of all the leaders in the state executive branch during this period, only Republican
George Allen, when he became governor in 1994, enthusiastically supported VMI’s exclusion of women.61 The legislature also stood behind VMI, reflecting the strong influence of VMI alumni in the state, but some legislators made vigorous efforts to change the
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Strum, supra note 3, at 90–91.
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Id. at 103; see also United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1408 (W.D. Va. 1991) (reporting that
the governor told the court that he did not oppose entry of summary judgment against him). The lack of
support by the Governor confused that matter when the case reached the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
“To the extent that the Governor’s view represents state policy,” the appellate panel wrote, “VMI’s singlesex admissions policy violates state policy.” United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 899 (4th Cir. 1992).
In the course of the second trial proceedings in 1994, Governor Wilder publicly supported the VWIL plan,
representing to the court that he was “satisfied that [the] plan is educationally sound and will remedy all
current discrimination.” Strum, supra note 3, at 208.
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Virginia, 976 F.2d at 894; Strum, supra note 3, at 196. Terry stated that she could not defend a position
opposite to that of the Governor and that, in any case, the Governor was correct in interpreting state policy
to preclude the exclusion of women. See also Chronology 1989–1993, The United States Department of
Justice vs. The Commonwealth of Virginia and Virginia Military Institute (on file with VMI Archives, Preston Library, Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, Va.) (stating that on November 27, 1990, Attorney
General Terry asked Judge Kiser to release her from the case “since she feels she cannot defend a position
opposite to that of the governor”). Four years later Terry would be the leading Democratic candidate for
governor and take the position that women should be admitted to VMI, while the three Republican candidates took the opposite position. Strum, supra note 3, at 198–99. Among other state officials who opposed
VMI’s exclusion of women was Gordon Davies, Executive Director of the Council of Higher Education,
which coordinated Virginia’s fifteen public institutions of higher learning. Davies was eventually dropped
as a defendant in the lawsuit. Id. at 89, 99. [see memo]
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Strum, supra note 3, at 94, 105; Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1408. Judge Niemeyer of the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals stated that this representation was taken on a pro bono basis, see 976 F.2d at 894; see also
Chronology, supra note 59. However, VMI was reported to have spent at least $14 million in legal and
other fees to defend the lawsuit, $6 million to the Patterson’s firm alone. Strum, supra note 3, at 298; see
also David Reed, VMI’s Fight Costs Over $14 Million: Alumni Footing Legal Bills, Roanoke Times, Jan.
19, 1998, at A1 (reporting that VMI spent $14 million to defend lawsuit, not counting a $6.9 million pledge
to endow the VWIL program at Mary Baldwin College). [see memo]
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See Allison Black, Allen Supports VMI Setting Up Separate Schools for Women, The Virginian-Pilot
(Norfolk, VA), Jan. 27, 1994, at D4. Upon hearing of VMI’s victory in the second district court trial, Allen
stated in his commencement address to VMI that he would “stand up to the arrogant, meddling federal bureaucrats whenever Virginia’s right and prerogative are threatened,” and suggested that the government had
tried to destroy VMI because it hated the things VMI stood for, including “the traditional American values
and virtues of moral character, personal discipline, self-reliance and an unabashed and unashamed love of
home, state and country, and the willingness to fight to defend them.” Donald P. Baer, Allen Assails Efforts
to End VMI’s All-Male Status, Wash. Post, May 22, 1994, at B4.
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all-male admissions policy.62 A majority of the Virginia public at the start of the litigation thought that VMI should admit women63 and, according to an informal poll, 62% of
the VMI faculty favored coeducation.64
B. The District Court Rationalizes the Exclusion of Women
On January 30, 1990, the Department of Justice made a formal request to Virginia’s Governor Wilder and to VMI Board of Visitors President Joseph M. Spivey, III,
for a commitment to abandon VMI’s single-sex admissions policy. VMI knew the request was coming, and was ready and waiting. Although the response was not due until
February 20, by February 5, VMI and the VMI Foundation had filed two pre-emptive
lawsuits in the local federal district court in the Western District of Virginia (Roanoke).
The sole judge in the district was Judge Jackson L. Kiser who, on a number of previous
occasions, had failed to properly apply sex discrimination laws, even after being reversed
on appeal.65 One suit was filed on behalf of VMI by state attorney general Terry. The
other was filed on behalf of the VMI Foundation by Griffin Bell and Robert Patterson.
Both suits sought declarative and injunctive relief “to prevent federal encroachment seeking to enforce unnecessary conformity in the state-supported system of higher education
in Virginia” and a declaration that VMI’s admissions policy was constitutional.66 Having
missed its chance to file the case first in a more friendly forum, DOJ then filed its own
suit in Roanoke, requesting a permanent injunction prohibiting VMI from discrimination
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Strum, supra note 3, at 88–92, 95–96, 104–05.
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A poll of 616 Virginians released in June 1989 showed that Virginians favored the admission of women
to VMI by a margin of 57% to 34%. The poll’s objectivity was disputed, and in February 1990 a second
poll was released showing a narrower gap (a ratio of 5-4) in favor of women’s admission. See A Challenge
to VMI’s Admissions Policy, Chronological Events, VMI Alumni Rev., Spring 1990, at 2l; Strum, supra
note 3, at 90.
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Brodie, supra note 6, at 19.
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One such case involved an action by the United States against a county sheriff for refusing to hire
women. Judge Kiser had first ruled that deputy sheriff positions were not covered by Title VII because
they fell within the “personal staff” exemption. The Fourth Circuit overruled him on this point but, on remand, again held that the positions at issue were exempted as personal staff positions. He also held that
maleness was a bona fide occupational qualification (“BFOQ”) for one of the positions (corrections officer). Judge Kiser was overruled again by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, and on the second remand,
Judge Kiser found that the U.S. had not presented sufficient evidence of discrimination. The Fourth Circuit
reversed Judge Kiser a third time, holding clearly erroneous his improper ignoring of admissions by the
sheriff, as well as other mistakes obscuring the opportunities for hiring women of which the sheriff failed to
take advantage. The facts and case history is summarized in the last Fourth Circuit opinion, United States
v. Gregory, 871 F.2d 1239 (4th Cir. 1989).
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Complaint at 1, VMI v. Thornburgh, No. 90-083 (W.D. Va. Filed Feb. 5, 1990) (Complaint at 1, VMI
Foundation v. United States, No. 90-084 (W.D. Va. Filed Feb. 5, 1990).
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on the basis of gender.67 Later that year, Judge Kiser consolidated the different actions
into a single case.68
At trial in the district court, testimony from nineteen witnesses took six days.
The government’s theory of the case tracked a familiar legal principle: women are
equal to men, and thus entitled to all the same benefits and opportunities. Although the
government conceded that few women were likely to be interested in attending the
state-supported school, it insisted that VMI could not exclude women so long as any
woman was able to satisfy VMI’s requirements.69
In contrast to the government’s controlled logic and the absence of tangible
beneficiaries, VMI’s presentation was impassioned and emphasized the high, human
stakes—the uniqueness of the school, its success in training leaders in Virginia, and the
honorable way of life it represented. VMI advocates argued that it would be foolish to
undermine that unique asset—indeed, jeopardize all single-sex schools—for some abstract principle that ignored differences between men and women. The school also
played a strong states’ rights card, arguing that the federal government’s Goliath should
not be allowed to force its own particular theory of education upon the sovereign state
of Virginia.70
Some years later, Judge Kiser remembered that before he got into the case, he
thought the government “had a slam-dunk position.”71 By the time he had heard the extensive evidence of the benefits of single-sex education, differences in the way men and
women learn, and the negative experience of gender integration at West Point and the
other service academies,72 however, he had changed his mind. His 1991 decision was a
complete victory for VMI. Comparing the case to the “life-and-death” confrontation between the United States and the Virginia Military Institute at New Market, Virginia in
1864,73 he invoked the traditional deference owed to states in educational decisionmaking—a deference that appeared somewhat surreal given the lack of support for VMI’s allmale policy by two state governors, the attorney general, the executive director of the
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United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991) (No. 90-0126-R).
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Virginia, No. 90-126 (W.D. Va. Nov. 27, 1990) (order).
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Strum, supra note 3, at 140.
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See, e.g., Strum, supra note 3, at 142–43.
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Interview with Jackson L. Kiser, District Judge, U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia,
in Danville, Va. (July 14, 2008).

72
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For a detailed account of the testimony on a wide range of issues, see Strum, supra note 3, at 139–72.

Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1408. For a description of the meaning of that battle to VMI, see supra text
accompanying note 33.
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Council of Higher Education, and a majority of the VMI faculty and non-VMI population
of the state.74
The core of Judge Kiser’s analysis was an account of the benefits of single-sex education. Citing studies showing that graduates of both male and female single-sex colleges
do better than graduates of coeducational colleges, Judge Kiser accepted VMI’s argument
that single-sex education offers substantial advantages over coeducational institutions75 and
that a ruling against VMI would threaten all single-sex educational institutions. In defining the battle broadly, the court avoided analysis of any factors particular to VMI that
might have been especially problematic. The presumed threat to single-sex education also
made the case increasingly a politically potent symbol and the source of substantial future
amicus support.76
The advantages of single-sex education did not explain why Virginia gave only
men, and not women, a single-sex option. Virginia attempted to justify this gap by demonstrating that through the fifteen schools it supported throughout the state, it provided a
diverse set of educational opportunities for its residents, and that VMI was an important
part of that diversity. Each of the schools had its own mission and standards, and all of
them but VMI were open to women. In particular, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and
State University (Virginia Tech) offered strong engineering programs and a military
training program.77
Judge Kiser agreed. Virginia’s stated interest in educational diversity was legitimate, and excluding women from VMI was necessary to accomplishing that diversity.
“The presence of women,” according to Judge Kiser, “would tend to distract male students from their studies” and “increase pressures relating to dating, which would tend to
impair the esprit de corps” and the egalitarian atmosphere so critical to the VMI experience.78 Women cadets would require allowances for privacy and other accommodations
that would dilute the strength of VMI’s adversative teaching method.79 The presence of
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See supra text accompanying notes 55–64.
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The primary source was Alexander W. Astin, Four Critical Years: Effects of College on Beliefs, Attitudes, and Knowledge (1977); see Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1412, 1435 (Findings VII. B. 10, 11) (“Students
of both sexes become more academically involved, interact with faculty frequently, show larger increases in
intellectual self-esteem and are more satisfied with practically all aspects of college experience . . . .”). Judge
Kiser failed to note that support for this claim was research based on 1961 to 1974 data, when single-sex
schools were among the most elite institutions in the country, and thus selected disproportionately by college applicants with the strongest credentials. At the second trial Astin was recruited by DOJ to dispute the
conclusions that the court had drawn from his research. At that point, the district court decided not to give
his testimony any weight. See infra note 108.
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See Strum, supra note 3, at 198, 235, 261–63.
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Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1411–12, 1418–19; Strum, supra note 3, at 150. But see infra note 89.
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Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1412.
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women would also require VMI to rethink its tough physical fitness requirements, since
few women would be able to meet the existing ones.80 Beyond these concrete dilutions
of standards, Judge Kiser concluded that women, by their very presence, would fundamentally alter an intangible element in the “VMI experience.” It would be impossible for
even the rare female who “could physically and psychologically undergo the rigors of the
life of a male cadet” to participate in this experience; “her introduction into the process
would change it,” making “the very experience she sought . . . no longer . . . available.”81
In other words, VMI’s maleness defined the experience, which women would destroy, as
evidenced by the many concessions to women made at West Point, the Air Force Academy, and the other federal service academies after Congress required them to admit
women.82
The district court opinion acknowledged that the deference to Virginia required in
this case “is not absolute,”83 and it articulated the intermediate standard of review for sexbased classifications established in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,84 requiring that there be “a substantial relationship between the single-sex admission policy and
achievement of the Commonwealth’s objective of educational diversity.”85 Judge Kiser’s
opinion, however, bore little evidence of that heightened standard.86 It did not surface
80

Id. at 1413. The minimum physical fitness requirement at VMI was sixty sit-ups and five pull-ups in
two minutes, and a one-and-one-half-mile run in twelve minutes. Strum, supra note 3, at 206. The court
here disregards the fact that about half of VMI’s new cadets fail the minimum fitness test, some of whom
eventually graduate without having passed the test. Brief for the Petitioner at 29, United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. 515 (1996) (Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107); Strum, supra note 3, at 150.
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Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1414.
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Congressional action occurred in 1975 before the federal courts had resolved a lawsuit filed by four
members of Congress who objected to being required to discriminate on the basis of sex in making nominations for the service academies. For a brief account, see Strum, supra note 3, at 116–23. For more detail,
see Jeanne Holm, Women in the Military: An Unfinished Revolution (1993). For the trial court’s comparisons between VMI and the service academies, see Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1432, 1439; Strum, supra note
3 at 143, 155–59, 169, 171.
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Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1409.
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458 U.S. 718 (1982).
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Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1410 (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 730). At one point Judge Kiser used the
“exceedingly persuasive justification language” set forth in several Supreme Court cases. See infra note
134. He referenced that language, however, to the strength of the evidence supporting VMI’s contention
that some students benefit from attending a single-sex college, rather than to the strength of the state’s justification for excluding women from VMI. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1411.
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Oddly, the court approvingly cited two cases decided before the Supreme Court began to raise the constitutional standard in sex discrimination cases. One case, Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C.
1970) (three-judge panel), aff’d per curiam, 401 U.S. 951 (1971), cited at Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1409,
upheld a challenge to an all-female school in South Carolina, Winthrop College. The other decision upheld
a consent decree in which the court “encouraged a settlement that required the [University of Virginia] to
admit women,” but refused to order the University to admit women because of its reluctance to “‘interfere
with the internal operation of any Virginia college or university,’” as well as concerns about the impact on
VMI. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1409–10 (citing Kirstein v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 309 F.
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any of the stereotypes upon which VMI based the exclusion of women. It did not question the plausibility of the diversity rationale offered by Virginia. It did not face the fact
that the only single-sex school remaining in Virginia’s “diverse” system existed for men.
Its eye was on purportedly undeniable differences between men and women and on the
unique and creative way VMI took account of those differences. “VMI truly marches to
the beat of a different drummer, and I will permit it to continue to do so.”87
The march would not end there.
C. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Accepts VMI’s Legitimate Purpose, but
Finds that Providing a Single-Sex Education Only to Men Is Unfair to Women
Both sides proceeded to the appellate stage faced with a difficult balancing act.
The federal government would be satisfied only if VMI admitted women and thus continued to claim that women would not change anything about the school. Yet its insistence that women were no different from men seemed implausible, even laughable, given
VMI’s pedagogical goal of developing men who were “more macho than thou.”88
VMI was caught in its own Catch-22. It emphasized the uniqueness of its adversative method in order to establish both its contribution to the “diverse” set of public educational opportunities in Virginia and the fact that women were unsuited to it and would
undermine it. But the more it stressed VMI’s uniqueness, the clearer it became that
women were missing out on something.89 Similarly, as the state spelled out the features
of VMI that established the tight fit between the school’s mission and the exclusion of
women, the relationship between VMI and the particular brand of maleness on which it
relied became clearer, and the State implicated itself more deeply in a system that promoted male superiority. While the United States did not explicitly challenge VMI on this
ground, surely the school was sensitive to the risks of overplaying its hand.
The Fourth Circuit panel accepted much of the district court’s analysis of the case.
It agreed that single-sex education offered substantial benefits over coeducation; that
VMI’s adversative method had particular, unique advantages to the men it served; and
Supp. 184, 187 (E.D. Va. 1970) (three-judge panel) (“One of Virginia’s educational institutions is military
in character. Are women to be admitted on an equal basis, and, if so, are they to wear uniforms and be
taught to bear arms?”)). The University of Virginia began admitting women in 1972. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 538 (1996).
87
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This phrase was used by an expert for VMI describing women who would be able to endure the adversative method. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 80, at 38; Jane Maslow Cohen, Equality for Girls and
Other Women: The Built Architecture of the Purposive Life, 9 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 103, 113 n.18, 45,
& 24 (1998).
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VMI’s claim of uniqueness also prevented Virginia from arguing coherently that women could receive
the same benefits at other schools in the state. At one point in the litigation, VMI suggested that an opportunity similar to that at VMI was available to women at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
but, as the Fourth Circuit noted in its later opinion, it did not press the point. See United States v. Virginia,
976 F.2d 890, 898 n.8 (4th Cir. 1992).
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that the presence of women at VMI would require changes to the core methodology of
the school and thus undermine its contribution to Virginia’s “diverse” set of higher education opportunities. On these grounds, it agreed that Virginia had a legitimate purpose
in maintaining VMI as an all-male school.90
At the same time, the panel agreed with the Justice Department that these benefits
could not be extended exclusively to men. “A policy of diversity which aims to provide
an array of educational opportunities, including single-gender institutions, must do more
than favor one gender,”91 Judge Niemeyer wrote for the three-judge panel. The bottom
line was not what VMI had hoped for: VMI would have to admit women, lose its state
funding, or establish a parallel program for women.92
It was clear that, as between these options, Judge Niemeyer expected Virginia to
pursue parallel programs. He also understood that, even with an option for women, the exclusion of women from VMI might still be considered discrimination based on sex. He
anticipated this objection by characterizing the potential continued exclusion of women as a
gender-neutral criterion based on homogeneity, rather than on maleness per se. “It is not
the maleness, as distinguished from femaleness, that provides justification for the program,” he wrote. “It is the homogeneity of gender in the process, regardless of which sex is
considered, that has been shown to be related to the essence of the education and training at
VMI.”93 With parallel programs, VMI would not necessarily have to admit women.
Not pleased with the alternatives offered by the appellate court, Virginia sought a
rehearing, both by the three-judge court and by the full court, en banc. Its appeal requests
were denied,94 but the court issued a stay of the ruling, pending appeal of the case to the
Supreme Court. For this appeal, VMI persuaded several women’s colleges to participate
as amici curiae. These amici argued that a ruling against VMI would not only throw single-sex colleges into doubt, but battered women’s shelters and single-sex prisons as
well.95 The Supreme Court, however, was not ready to hear the case and denied certiorari.96 The parties would need to proceed in light of the Fourth Circuit opinion.
D. The Second Trial, and Appeal, Approving Separate, Parallel Programs
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Virginia, 976 F.2d at 897–98.
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Id. at 899.
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Id. at 900.
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Virginia, 976 F.2d 890 (No. 91-1690) (petition for rehearing with suggestion for rehearing en banc filed
Nov. 19, 1992).
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Strum, supra note 3, at 198.

Virginia Military Institute v. United States, 508 U.S. 946 (1993) (with Justice Scalia stating that the issue should receive the attention of the Court, but that “we generally await final judgment in the lower
courts before exercising our certiorari judgment”).
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The VMI alumni community was shaken by the Fourth Circuit decision and considered how to respond to it. One possibility was to give up state funding and remain allmale, which many supporters favored. While this possibility remained under consideration, in June 1993, the VMI Board of Visitors told its lawyers to begin drawing up a proposal for a substitute program for women, the existence of which also would allow VMI
to stay all-male.97
As it happened, only thirty-five miles away a 2,000-student, all-female private
school, Mary Baldwin College, had been thinking of developing a leadership program. It
would become an issue at the next trial just when the school first began this thinking, and
when the goal of developing “citizen soldier” became part of the concept. Whether Mary
Balwin College’s interest in a leadership program was fortuitous or opportunistic, by
September 1993, Mary Baldwin had approved the development of a women’s leadership
program with a military emphasis—Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership Institute
(“VWIL”)—and VMI had committed to it $6.5 million in endowment and operating
funds. Governor Wilder pledged an additional $6.9 million in state funds for start-up
costs.98
Over the next year, a task force from Mary Baldwin made up of faculty, administrators, and a student developed the details of the VWIL proposal. Their charge was to develop the most effective model of leadership training for producing “citizen-soldiers who
are educated and honorable women, prepared for the varied work of civil life, qualified to
serve in the armed forces, imbued with love of learning, confident in the functions of attitudes of leadership, and possessing a high sense of public service.”99
By February 1994, when the constitutionality of the proposed parallel, single-sex
programs came before the district court, the VWIL plan provided for a detailed academic
program with required courses in the liberal arts, leadership, physical education, and health.
The plan provided that every student have a leadership externship, organize a community
service project or campus activity, and participate in a one-week wilderness program run
by students and a twice-a-week “Cooperative Confidence Building” program involving obstacle courses, rappelling, and a ropes course. The proposal also required four years of
ROTC training, for which students would be bussed to VMI. VWIL students would become part of a Virginia Corps of Cadets, along with students from VMI and the coed Virginia Tech corps. Freshmen would participate in a one-week “Cadre week orientation” in
the summer. Upper-class students would provide mentoring, enforce behavior regulations,
organize leadership speakers, and exercise leadership responsibilities.100
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The goal was never to replicate the VMI program at Mary Baldwin College, and
those who developed the proposal understood that the differences between the VWIL
proposal and VMI were substantial. The purpose of VWIL was to develop female citizen
soldiers, not to duplicate the adversative method of VMI. Its method was “cooperative”
and designed to reinforce self-esteem, rather than to tear down egos and the cadet’s sense
of individuality.101 VWIL’s focus was on “building up self confidence through mastery
of physical, intellectual, and experiential challenges.”102 VWIL students would live with
other VWIL students for at least one year, but the living accommodations would not be as
sparse as VMI’s. Moreover, doors to the rooms would have locks, and showers and tubs
would have doors or curtains. VWIL women would wear uniforms only on the days in
which they were participating in ROTC or the Virginia Corps of Cadets. They would not
be subject to an unrelenting military regime, nor would VWIL women be issued arms.
Physical fitness requirements, though judged by the district court to be “comparable in
rigor and challenge,” would be less demanding than VMI’s.103
While some differences between VWIL and VMI were based on pedagogical philosophy, others were a consequence of resource constraints and the expected lack of a
critical mass of women interested in certain aspects of VMI’s program. For example, the
VWIL curriculum would have no courses in engineering or advanced math or physics;
VWIL students wanting these courses would have to attend Washington University in St.
Louis, with whom Mary Baldwin had a relationship.104 Mary Baldwin would have fewer
NCAA-level sports, and the athletic facilities would be substantially inferior to those of
VMI. Proportionally fewer of Mary Baldwin’s faculty had Ph.D.’s, and faculty salaries
were in the lowest 20% in the country, whereas VMI’s were in the top 8%. The average
SAT score of students at Mary Baldwin was 100 points lower than that at VMI.105
Judge Kiser was not troubled by the differences between the programs. He
pointed out that the Fourth Circuit had specified not an “equal” school for women,” but
rather a “parallel institution[s] or parallel program[s].” Identical programs could not have
been intended by the appellate court, Judge Kiser reasoned, since no one could expect a
new program to “supply those intangible qualities of history, reputation, tradition, and
prestige that VMI has amassed over the years.” It was “unrealistic to think that the
101
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Fourth Circuit was requiring an exercise in futility.”106 Moreover, the appellate court had
noted in The Citadel case that any parallel program “must take into account the nature of
the difference on which the separation [of the sexes] is based, the relevant benefits to the
needs of each gender, the demand (both in terms of quality and quantity), and any other
relevant factor.”107
The district court believed that these signals from the appellate court left ample
room to take into account the different needs and learning patterns of women about which
many witnesses testified.108 The differences, Judge Kiser concluded, made the VMI
model unsuitable for women; the same model “would not produce the same outcomes for
the VWIL population as it does for the VMI population.”109 Moreover, the rationale for
Virginia’s separate colleges and universities compelled different educational models:
“The very concept of diversity precludes the Commonwealth from offering an identical
curriculum at each of its colleges.”110 The uniqueness of VWIL, like the uniqueness of
VMI, was a strength, not a liability.111 Finally, although VMI’s curricular offerings, facilities, and faculty were superior to those of Mary Baldwin’s,112 the tuition of VWIL and
VMI students would be the same, as would the per-student support received directly from
the state.113 The bottom line was that VWIL would “attain an outcome for women that is
comparable to that received by young men upon graduation from VMI.”114 “[I]f VMI
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There were significant disputes at the trial and thereafter about the expertise of the experts, which included a woman’s studies historian, Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, who testified that the lack of confidence of
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Carol Gilligan’s work supported its position, but she pointed out at the appellate level that the experts upon
whom Judge Kiser had relied were not experts and that the scientific evidence did not show that men benefited from single-sex education. Id. at 153, 217, 258. Alexander Astin’s scholarship had been relied upon
in the first trial by Judge Kiser for the benefits of single-sex education, but in the second trial Astin was a
witness for DOJ, disputing the inappropriateness of a VMI education for women. Id. at 225. At that point,
Judge Kiser dismissed his testimony because, among other things, his opposition to VMI’s all-male admissions policy impaired his objectivity. See Virginia, 852 F. Supp. at 479. He apparently found Dr. FoxGenovese’s objectivity unimpaired by the fact that she favored VMI remaining an all-male school. Id. at
480–81; Strum, supra note 3, at 229.
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The district court found, for example, that VMI’s $131 million endowment made it the largest on a per
student basis than any other undergraduate institution, as compared to Mary Baldwin’s $19 million endowment. Id. at 503.
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Id. at 483 & n.19.
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marches to the beat of a drum, then Mary Baldwin marches to the melody of a fife and
when the march is over, both will have arrived at the same destination.”115 On these
grounds, the “remedial” plan was approved.116
By a 2-to-1 vote, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s decision. The majority reiterated its prior analysis that single-sex education is a legitimate and important governmental objective, and that VMI’s adversative
method would not work if women were present. However, while the panel had earlier
indicated that admitting women would be one available option, two of the three judges
now suggested that gender integration would be irresponsible because of the hostile environment a coeducation environment would create for women.117 “If we were to place men
and women into the adversative relationship inherent in the VMI program,” Judge Niemeyer wrote for the panel majority, “we would destroy . . . any sense of decency that still
permeates the relationship between the sexes.”118
Judge Phillips dissented, previewing the analysis that the U.S. Supreme Court
would eventually bring to the case. In his view, diversity was not the state’s actual purpose in establishing either VMI or the VWIL program; diversity was merely a rationalization designed to allow VMI to continue to exclude women.119 Moreover, even if
diversity was the legitimate state objective, no parallel program could satisfy the midlevel scrutiny required by the U.S. Constitution unless the programs were “substantially
equal in all of the relevant criteria, tangible and intangible, by which educational institutions are evaluated.”120 To Judge Phillips, the differences in prestige, tradition, and
alumni influence alone, even without the significant differences in curriculum, funding,
facilities, faculty, and library, meant that the state was not offering equal programs to
men and women.121
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Id. at 484.

117

United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229, 1239 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that the adversative method that is
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George H. Roberts, Jr., Case Set for Oral Argument September 28, 1994: The Citadel Stays All Male, But
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Judge Phillips asked for a rehearing en banc, which failed to get the necessary
votes. Both parties then sought higher review.
122

E. The United States Supreme Court: Assimilation Without Change
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari,123 and in this final stretch, both sides
raised the ante. As cross-petitioners, Virginia returned to its original position that VMI’s
all-male admissions policy was justified and constitutional, with or without VWIL.124
Numerous amici curiae filed briefs with the Court to underscore the importance of the
issue they claimed the case raised: the survival of single-sex education.125
For its part, the United States, for the first time in any litigation, argued that “strict
scrutiny” was the appropriate standard for reviewing sex-based classifications.126 This
argument was clearly an invitation to Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who on many occasions as a women’s rights advocate had promoted this position before the Court.127 A
number of the amici curiae briefs supported the strict scrutiny argument.128
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Although six judges had voted to rehear the case en banc and four had voted against rehearing, three
judges had recused themselves, United States v. Virginia, 52 F.3d 90, 91 (4th Cir. 1995); rehearing en banc
under Fourth Circuit rules permits rehearing en banc only with a majority of the Circuit’s judges without
regard to recusals. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 530 n.4 (1996). Judge Diana Gribbon Motz
wrote a stinging dissent from the denial of rehearing, on behalf of herself and three other judges. Virginia,
52 F.3d 90.
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Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229, cert. granted, 516 U.S. 910 (1995).
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Brief for the Cross-Petitioners at 36–47, United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (Nos. 94-1941,
94-2107). As respondent, Virginia focused its defense of the parallel programs offered by VMI and VWIL.
Brief for the Respondents at 19–42, Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107).
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Citadel, and Mary Baldwin College, and the attorney generals of Wyoming and Pennsylvania. Strum, supra note 3, at 261–63.
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See Deborah L. Markowitz, In Pursuit of Equality: One Woman’s Work to Change the Law, 14
Women’s Rts. L. Rep. 335 (1992); Toni J. Ellington et al., Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Gender Discrimination, 20 U. Haw. L. Rev. 699 (1998). Justice Ginsburg was involved in efforts to elevate the constitutional standard for reviewing sex-based classifications in numerous cases since the Court first began to
exercise review beyond the traditional “rational basis” test in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 71 (1971), Ginsburg had convinced four justices that strict scrutiny was the
appropriate standard of review. Markowitz, supra, at 344, n.106.
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The ALCU Women’s Rights Project and the National Women’s Law Center submitted an amicus curiae
brief on behalf of twenty-nine different organizations, including the American Jewish Committee, the AntiDefamation League, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and People for the
American Way. Other amici included the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Nancy Mel-
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In a 7-1 decision,129 the Supreme Court concluded that VMI’s exclusion of
women violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.130 Writing for herself and five other Justices, Justice Ginsburg did not mention strict scrutiny, aside from
observing in a footnote that the most stringent judicial scrutiny is not all that it was once
cracked up to be.131 Instead, she interwove the now-familiar standard that the challenged
classification must serve “important governmental objectives” to which the discriminatory means are “substantially related,”132 with language also found in earlier cases thatsuggested that sex-based classifications will fail if they are not supported by an
“exceedingly persuasive justification.”133
Since the introduction of “exceeding persuasive justification” language in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney,134 the place of this language in middletier intermediate review135 had never been clear. Chief Justice Rehnquist, concurring in
the judgment, stated that the “exceedingly persuasive justification” language was intended as an “observation on the difficulty of meeting the applicable test” rather than as a
“formulation of the test itself.”136 In the majority opinion in VMI, however, Justice Ginsburg appeared to forward the language as the test itself137—indeed, as the “starting point
of the analysis.”138 In addition, in characterizing the appropriate standard of review, she
lette (the lead plaintiff in The Citadel, after Shannon Faulkner dropped out of the school), and eighteen
active and retired military officers. Strum, supra note 3, at 255–61.
129

Justice Thomas did not participate because his son was a cadet at VMI at the time. See Strum, supra
note 3, at 246; Brodie, supra note 6, at 21.
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United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
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Id. at 632 n.6 (noting that “last Term observed that strict scrutiny...is not inevitably ‘fatal in fact’”).
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442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979). This language also appears in Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461
(1981), Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982), Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S.
728 (1984), and J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 136 (1994).
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See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“To withstand constitutional challenge . . . classifications
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Virginia, 518 U.S. at 559 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Rehnquist does not mention J.E.B., 511 U.S.
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J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 136, 142 n.12.
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See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531 (“Parties who seek to defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for that action.”); id. at 534 (“Virginia has shown no ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for excluding all women from the citizen-soldier training afforded by
VMI.”).
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Kevin N. Rolando, A Decade Later: United States v. Virginia and the Rise and Fall of “Skeptical Scrutiny,” 12 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 182, 207 (2006).
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introduced a new term—“skeptical scrutiny.”139 Commentators have assumed that these
words signaled a shift to a new and more rigorous standard in sex discrimination cases.140
In a 2002 interview, Justice Ginsburg downplayed the shift, stating that the VMI case and
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan were “essentially the same,” with the 7-1
vote in VMI—as compared to the 5-4 decision in the Mississippi case—showing that “the
court had learned a lot in those years, between ’82 and ’96.”141 Whatever the Justices
may have intended when the decision was published in 1996, no case before United
States v. Virginia, or since, summoned a majority to state the test in such strong terms;
the case set a heightened, near-strict standard of review, from which subsequent majorities have seemed to withdraw.142
In the majority opinion, Justice Ginsburg riveted her analysis to the long historical
narrative of women’s rights litigation—a story Justice Ginsburg knew well from her
many years as a leading advocate for women’s rights.143 History, she pointed out, has
disproved stereotypes about women’s proper place in society, women’s ability to thrive
only in cooperative settings and not in adversarial ones, and outmoded concerns that the
presence of women in traditionally male pursuits led to the degradation of public norms
of decency and propriety.144 So, too, history would disprove Virginia’s claim that women
cannot make the grade at VMI, or would destroy the adversative system that had made

139

Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531 (“Today’s skeptical scrutiny of official action denying rights or opportunities
based on sex responds to volumes of history.”).
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See, e.g., Christopher H. Pyle, Women’s Colleges: Is Segregation by Sex Still Justifiable After United
States v. Virginia?, 77 B.U. L. Rev. 209, 233 (1997) (opinion came as close as possible to strict scrutiny
without actually adopting it); Deborah L. Brake, Reflections on the VMI Decision, 6 Am. U. J. Gender & L.
35, 36 (1997) (“[T]he standard applied in VMI is essentially as rigorous as today’s strict scrutiny standard.”); Jon Gould, The Triumph of Hate Speech Regulation: Why Gender Wins But Race Loses in America, 6 Mich. J. Gender & L. 153, 214 (1999) (“In VMI ... the Court invented a new test for gender
classifications that closely resembles the strict scrutiny test of race.”); see also Sunstein, supra note 9, at 73
(“Virginia heightens the level of scrutiny and brings it closer to the ‘strict scrutiny’ that is applied to discrimination on the basis of race.”). In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia charged the Court with raising
the standard, 518 U.S. at 573–74 (Scalia, J., dissenting), and Chief Justice Rehnquist with confusing it, 518
U.S. at 559 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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and transcript, available at 2002 WLNR 13867838.
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note 138 (arguing that Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998), Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001), and
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Choices: Legal Feminism and the Historical Dynamics of Change, 92 Cal. L. Rev. 755, 829–31 (2004)
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VMI unique and valuable. From this historical standpoint, Virginia’s claims about
women’s limitations were simply not persuasive.145
Justice Ginsburg also used history to demonstrate that states sometimes trump up
after-the-fact justifications for measures that restrict women’s opportunities. Virginia’s
assertion that VMI’s all-male admissions policy furthered its interest in educational diversity was an example.146 Justice Ginsburg’s closer look through an historical lens revealed a tradition of gender stereotypes and exclusion in Virginia’s educational system.
Women’s seminaries and colleges in Virginia had not been merely separate but also unequal to those established for men in terms of resources and stature.147 The state’s justification simply didn’t wash.148 Not only was VMI’s exclusion of women based on
stereotypes about women, but the state’s asserted purpose for VMI was a cover for a design to reinforce those stereotypes and keep women in their unequal status.
Having concluded that the absence of equal opportunities for women was constitutional defective, the question then remained whether the parallel program for women at
Mary Baldwin College cured the defect. Facing this question, the Court had two choices.
It could have determined that separate, all-male facilities can never be equal—or are inherently unequal—as it had held in Brown v. Board of Education with respect to race.149
It did not do so. Instead, it proceeded to compare the two programs as if comparability
was achievable and, under the right circumstances, constitutionally acceptable.150 In
judging comparability, however, Justice Ginsburg brought the same skepticism to bear on
the motivation and design of the VWIL program as she had on the exclusion of women
from VMI. She found the VWIL solution “reminiscent” of effort by Texas decades earlier to preserve the University of Texas Law School for Whites, by establishing a separate
school for Blacks.151 The differences between the programs reflected the same stereotypes that Virginia had deployed in excluding women from VMI initially.152 The academic programs, facilities, and faculty were pale versions of VMI, and VWIL lacked the
“unique” adversative barracks experience that was, even by the district court’s account,
where the “most important aspects of the VMI educational experience occur.”153
145

Id. at 540–43.
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While using a demanding standard to evaluate Virginia’s separate programs, Justice Ginsburg reserved the broader question of whether single-sex schools are constitutional. Indeed, she appeared sympathetic to the twenty-six single-sex colleges who had
argued to the Court as amici curiae that single-sex schools can sometimes “dissipate,
rather than perpetuate, traditional gender classifications.”154 The opinion, however,
eliminated the single-sex option in this case. That left two options: VMI could admit
women, or it could break its ties with the state of Virginia.155
III. Beyond Assimilation: Unconstitutional Maleness?
In United States v. Virginia, Justice Ginsburg combined two separate difficulties
with sex stereotypes. First, stereotypes are often inaccurate, allocating opportunities of
men and women on the basis of false assumptions rather than their actual characteristics.156
Second, even when stereotypes have some truth to them, use of them can become selffulfilling prophecies, thereby reinforcing inequalities between men and women and
women’s inferior status.157
Because of Justice Ginsburg’s attention to the role of stereotypes in perpetuating
women’s inferior status, as well as to the problem of false stereotypes, some commentators
have argued that her jurisprudence is based in an anti-subordination perspective, rather than
in formal equality.158 Cass Sunstein credits Justice Ginsburg with a “distinctive understanding of sex equality” that moves beyond the denial of difference between men and
women to identifying the problem as one of “second-class citizenship.”159 Yet, even as
Ginsburg identified the issue of women’s legal, social, and economic inferiority in United
States v. Virginia, her focus remained on the falseness of assumptions about women’s dif-
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ferent learning styles, different physical capacities, and different needs. This focus was
sufficient to deciding the case, but in tying the perpetuation of women’s inferiority to
false stereotypes, it captured only part of the problem with VMI. In particular, it failed to
address the way in which VMI actively constructed that inferiority. For Justice Ginsburg,
the critical point was that VMI did not prove its claim that women were significantly different from men and would require changes in the adversative method.160 Nothing in her
analysis challenged the acceptability of the method itself.
Justice Ginsburg’s focus mirrored the government’s position the case. From the
beginning, DOJ lawyers focused on VMI’s assumptions about women’s impact on the
school’s teaching methodology rather than on the legitimacy of that methodology. The
federal government’s central strategy sought to disprove VMI’s claim that women were
different from men and would thus require changes to the unique benefits of the school.
True to the formal equality paradigm on which this position was based, DOJ lawyers insisted that the women who would be admitted to VMI would be as equally qualified as
the men admitted to VMI and thus would not affect the purity of the adversative method.
The method itself was not questioned.
In friendly exchange at oral argument in 1992 before the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit, Judge Phillips tried to move one of the lawyers, Jessica Silver, beyond the government’s attachment to the “no-change” position. “So what” if the presence of women caused VMI to alter its method, Judge Phillips pressed Ms. Silver. Isn’t
change “just . . . the price you have to pay” for the higher value of equality?161 To Judge
Phillips, it was not enough to determine whether women would change VMI; the question, even assuming women’s entry to the school would change it, was whether the institution that VMI was trying to preserve had sufficient value to justify women’s exclusion.
Ms. Silver declined to compromise the government’s thin view of the case, going so far
as to concede that if it were shown that women would change the institution, VMI would
not be required to admit them.162
In oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Breyer also seemed to
recognize that even if women’s presence at VMI would change some of its “unique” features, this fact was not dispositive of the case. Responding to the argument of Virginia’s
lawyer, former solicitor general Theodore Olson, that the presence of women would require a change in the adversative method—a method that “works”163—Justice Breyer
analogized the exclusion of women from VMI to the hypothetical exclusion of other protected groups:
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[C]ouldn’t you say exactly the same thing about ethnic or racial or any
other [group], I mean somebody could have a school, and they say, we’re keeping
a [certain] group . . . out . . . because we have a certain unique kind of education .
. . and once they’re in . . . they’ll change the nature of [the method] . . . .
I mean, don’t we have to look at the importance of this thing? . . .
Isn’t the answer [to the claim that they’ll change it], so what? You’d have
to show that it’s important enough to maintain this adversative process . . .
. . . What is it that is so important about it that enables you to say to a
woman I’m very sorry, even though you want to go there and you want this result,
you can’t?164
In questioning the adequacy of the argument that women would change VMI
enough to justify their exclusion, Justice Breyer seemed to take seriously VMI’s concern—in a way the government’s position did not—that an important “way of life” would
be lost if the school admitted women. However, the fact that women might change VMI
and cause the loss of a way of life did not necessarily justify the preservation of VMI as it
then existed. Women could be expected to change VMI, as they had juries, workplaces,
and police forces, but the possibility of such change did not determine the outcome of the
case.165
Paul Bender from the Solicitor General’s office, too, recognized that VMI posed
problems beyond its exclusion of women. Arguing the case for the United States in the
Supreme Court, he stated:
What we have here is a single sex institution for men that’s designed as a place to
teach manly values that only men can learn, to show that men can suffer adversity
and succeed, and a single sex institution for women . . . that is openly, expressly, deliberately designed to teach to women womanly values, feminine values.166
The position taken by DOJ in its briefs did not reflect this critical, substantive dimension of the case. Instead, it froze the constitutional wrong at VMI’s exclusion of
women, basing its case on an assumption that was so implausible to those who knew VMI
that some observers charged that the government was trying to destroy VMI, not integrate
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it.167 Except in the few passing questions and references summarized above, questions
about the value of those aspects of VMI used to justify women’s exclusion from the school
went unasked. Missing from the government’s arguments, as well as from the Court’s
analysis, was any recognition that VMI’s absorption of women into the school, “as is,”
would leave intact the fundamental premises of women’s inferiority that were embedded
within the school’s design. The government and the Court both treated VMI as an institution that had made inaccurate stereotypes about women. In focusing on the right of women
to be admitted, the analysis missed that women would be entering an institution that was
fundamentally hostile to them.168
If the government had pursued the issue of Virginia’s support to an institution that
furthered a particular version of masculinity that unconstitutionally denigrated women, it
would have presented evidence more directed to this concern. Some of the briefs filed on
appeal suggest the kind of evidence that might have been developed more fully at the trial
court level. For example, a group of eighteen active and retired military officers submitted
an amicus curiae brief arguing that there was no proved relationship between the method
and the goal of producing citizen-soldiers. They urged that VMI should be preparing cadets for mixed-gender societies, not all-male ones.169 The brief also criticized the adversa-
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tive method on the grounds that the stress it imposed was “artificial” and did not necessarily prepare cadets for real-life or combat stress.170 If the government had chosen a
broader view of the case, it presumably would also have put in the record further evidence
of how the adversative method promoted the values of male superiority and female subordination.
With a sufficient showing of the deficiencies of the adversative method, VMI opponents would not have had to concede that VMI could exclude women if their presence
would change the school, as Jessica Silver suggested in oral argument.171 Instead, a sufficient showing that the school promoted male superiority and female inferiority would
have strengthened the position that women should be admitted to VMI. If VMI was unconstitutionally male, it would have to change, one way or another. Indeed, an institution
that continued to promote a “male ethos” should not have continued to receive state support no matter who was admitted to it.172
If the Court had recognized the constitutional problem with an educational pedagogy that degraded women, it also would have been clear that VMI needed guidance
about how to proceed with gender integration. The assumption that VMI would not
change with the admission of women made such guidance unnecessary. But if VMI was
unconstitutionally promoting male superiority, a remedy would have had to take account
of those aspects of a VMI education that had this effect, including those features of the
adversative method that motivated male cadets through an appeal to their desire to dominate women.
Greater consideration of the subordination element of the case also could have led
to more judicial direction going forward about when and how states can develop singlesex educational opportunities. Despite the threat that admitting women from VMI would
have meant the end of single-sex education everywhere,173 separate programs arguably
are not a problem if members of both sexes have comparable, voluntary options and are
equally valued and served —i.e., if the programs do not subordinate women to men. The
new generation of single-sex public elementary and secondary schools holds more promise, in this regard, than single-sex schools that were developed at a time when education
for women was for a different purpose than education for men and based on countless
riculum, so long as the institutions “offer the same quality of education and [a]re of the same overall caliber.” Id. at 565.
170
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Brief for Cornum, supra note 169, at 11–12.
See supra text accompanying notes 161–162.
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Judge Phillips was pursuing the same issue when he asked the lead Virginia attorney, Robert Patterson,
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Brief for the Respondents at 17–18, Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107). Justice Scalia in
his dissenting opinion treated this threat as a serious one, stating that the majority opinion put not only public single-sex schools in jeopardy, but private ones as well. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 598–600 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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stereotypes of women’s interests, abilities, and learning styles. Recently enacted regulations by the U.S. Department of Education under Title IX of the 1972 Education
Amendments recognize the difference.174 The Court’s majority opinion offers little help
in determining whether these regulations are constitutional.
The possibility exists that the assimilation strategy was the one most likely to win
the case and that pushing further into the substantive problems with VMI’s educational
program would have cost Justice Ginsburg the votes she needed. Just as an incrementalist
strategy had succeeded in gaining women access to areas of life from which they were previously excluded, so perhaps the assertion that the admission of women to VMI would not
have changed it—if not completely realistic—made the entrance of women to yet another
male sphere less threatening.
However, the downside of the assimilation ideal should not be taken lightly. While
this ideal has helped bring about significant opportunity for women, it also has reinforced
the notion that the only changes to be expected from gender equality are expanded opportunities, not changes to institutional structures and societal attitudes. This message reassures those institutions being asked to accept women, but it also cautions those who would
integrate them not to expect too much change.175 What came next at VMI bears out these
limitations.
IV. The Aftermath: Assimilation with Negotiated Accommodations
On June 28, 1996, two days after the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
Virginia, The Citadel announced that it would begin accepting women applicants.176 Coeducation would not happen as quickly at VMI. Board members studied the viability of
privatization to enable VMI to remain all-male, while the VMI administration also pre174

These regulations offer considerable flexibility for school districts to develop single-sex elementary and
secondary programs. They require that such programs be voluntary, even-handed, subject to periodic
evaluations, and with a purpose either to promote diversity, or to respond to a specific educational need.
See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 71 Fed. Reg. 62,530 (Oct. 25, 2006) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106); Access to Classes
and Schools, 34 C.F.R. § 106.34 (2009). For a discussion of these and other guidelines, and of the likely
constitutionality of these regulations, see Rebecca A. Kiselewich, In Defense of the 2006 Title IX Regulations for Single-Sex Public Education: How Separate Can be Equal, 49 B.C. L. Rev. 217 (2008); Benjamin
O. Carr, Can Separate Be Equal? Single-Sex Classrooms, The Constitution, and Title IX, 83 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 409 (2007); Kimberly J. Jenkins, Constitutional Lessons for the Next Generation of Public Single-Sex
Elementary and Secondary Schools, 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1953 (2006). Single-sex programs in public
schools have multiplied since United States v. Virginia. In 1995, there were three public high schools with
all-female student bodies. The National Association for Public Single-Sex Education reports that in the
2005–2006 academic year, forty-four public elementary and secondary schools in the United States were
single-sex, thirteen of which opened or became single-sex that year. Jenkins, supra, at 1957.
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Mitu Gulati, Race to the Top of the Corporate Ladder: What Minorities Do When They Get There, 61
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1645 (2004).
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pared to admit women. The school’s Superintendent Major General Josiah Bunting III
understood that the privatization option probably would not work, but he also realized
that a substantial segment of the VMI community preferred a private, all-male option to a
public coeducational institution and thought that point of view deserved a full hearing.
At the same time, he determined that if VMI were to accept females, it needed to start
early to plan it right.177 He was not prepared to fail. “[I]f we’re going to do it,” Bunting
told the Board, “We’re going to do it well—extraordinarily well.”178
Bunting’s caution would turn out to produce a more successful integration of
women at VMI than occurred at The Citadel,179 but the slower pace also created substantial tension between VMI and the DOJ who, along with representatives of some of the
women’s groups who had participated in the litigation, accused VMI of stalling.180 VMI
committees worked through the summer months on parallel tracks to develop both a privatization plan and a plan to integrate women.181 On September 10th, believing that VMI
was not moving fast enough to integrate, DOJ filed an emergency motion in the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals demanding that women be admitted immediately.182
On September 21, 1996, while this motion was pending, the VMI Board of Visitors,
by a 9-8 vote, passed a resolution to accept women, beginning in August of 1997.183 An
important factor in the decision was that privatlization would require VMI to raise $250–
$300 million in endowment, or the equivalent of expected return on this amount on an annual basis, to replace its state and federal subsidies184—this after VMI alumni had already

177

Id. at 298–99.

178

Brodie, supra note 6, at 49. General Bunting lost support among some alumni, who felt he should have
resigned as a matter of principle when VMI was ordered to admit women, rather than submit to the Court’s
order. Bunting Speech Ended on Losing Note, Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 13, 2001, at C2.
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180

Strum, supra note 3, at 299–300.

181

VMI communications with alumni made it clear that the privatization option had been under study for
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paid more than $14 million in legal fees, public relations, and payments to VWIL.185 In
addition, then-Governor George Allen expressed some concern that privatization would
make VMI a civil rights pariah.186 Moreover, the Department of Defense had made clear
that it intended to terminate the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (“ROTC”) program at
VMI unless it submitted a remedial plan to integrate women.187
With the decision made, General Bunting himself set an extraordinarily positive
tone of professionalism and commitment to making gender integration succeed. “When
you are given a lawful order,” he stated in an interview, “you must execute it. Professionals may not allow their resentments to affect their work.”188 He understood, at least
among “home” audiences, that creating and maintaining this attitude throughout the
school would take some doing. “We will have to effect a cultural change, an attitudinal
change, many of us in ourselves,” he told the Board. “[D]oubt, skepticism, cynicism, sorrow are not fertile soil in which to plant the seeds of a new coeducational VMI. ... Healing and building will have to occur simultaneously.”189 Although Bunting would
continue privately to take the position that VMI should not have been required to admit
women,190 he proceeded to make decisions designed to make the integration of women as
successful as possible, promising that “none of the individual women will be made to feel
any more unwelcome than any of the young men.”191
The one area in which Bunting let his resentment show was in his continuing, adversarial dealings with the DOJ. Throughout the course of the planning for the admission
of women, which was to be officially supervised by Judge Kiser,192 ongoing disputes persisted about what accommodations would be made. Early on, both sides altered the positions they had held during litigation. While VMI had claimed during the litigation that
mond Times-Dispatch, May 13, 2001, at C2 (stating that “the school would have needed an immediate
$250 million in cash” to go private).
185
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the admission of women would require so many changes that the school would lose what
made it valuable, it now insisted that female cadets would be treated exactly the same as
males.193 Conversely, while DOJ had insisted during the litigation that no significant
changes would be needed to accommodate women, advocates for the potential female
cadets immediately began talking about the need to permit women to have longer haircuts
and lighter physical requirements, calling the intention to shave women’s heads “vindictive” and criticizing the “total equality” approach announced by General Bunting as “just
an excuse to exclude women.”194 In its October 17, 1996, motion to the district court to
compel VMI to develop a detailed coeducation plan, DOJ asked the court to require VMI
to remove from all promotional materials items that could discourage women from attending VMI, to substitute more encouraging images, and to make adjustments to the rat
line traditions.195
From the beginning, the parties squabbled about how much detail VMI would
have to supply to the DOJ about the transition plan. Bunting resisted providing the kind
of specific plans demanded by DOJ, believing that the government’s effort to ascertain
and supervise every facet of the plan was an attempt to remake VMI in the image of the
federal service academies. DOJ’s mistrust of VMI and its attempt to supervise the process of admitting women, Bunting said, “is a direct challenge to our independence and our
honor and, I may add, our professionalism.”196 With a politician’s instincts, however,
Bunting communicated extensively with alumni and friends both about VMI’s preparations for women and about its refusal to comply with all federal requests for information.197
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On December 2, 1996, in response to the DOJ motion for a detailed integration
plan, Judge Kiser acknowledged that VMI had not yet submitted a formal plan, but it
noted that VMI had taken a number of steps toward the integration of women, including
recruitment efforts, facilities changes, program development, financial aid, and the hiring
of necessary personnel. It also noted that the instructions from the appellate court did not
require that Virginia get prior approval of a plan of action. Clearly impatient with both
sides, Judge Kiser wrote that the government’s claim that VMI was dragging its feet was
overstated, but that “had the United States been kept informed as to what Virginia was
doing to comply with the mandate of the Supreme Court, the present motion would not
have been necessary.”198
VMI continued giving DOJ less detail than it asked for, but it did proceed to file
comprehensive, quarterly reports with the court.199 DOJ continued to oversee VMI’s
processes, which continued to irritate VMI. For example, DOJ forbade direct contact
with the federal service academies without its permission—contact that might have been
able to provide useful information about what had worked at other institutions—on the
grounds that VMI was still a party to a federal lawsuit and the federal academies were
also DOJ clients.200
One of Bunting’s earliest decisions was putting then-Colonel Mike Bissell in charge
of the planning process for the integration of women at VMI. Bissell had been serving as
the commandant of cadets at VMI (equivalent to the dean of students at many colleges) and
also as the commandant of VWIL, coordinating the two colleges’ programs.201 Bissell became chair of an executive committee consisting of seven subcommittee heads, seven cadets, and a few specialists. He established subcommittees, made up of faculty, staff,
alumni, and cadets, to examine issues relating to the recruitment of women, facilities, academics, athletics, orientation, public relations, and co-curricular activities. The inclusion of
more than 100 cadets on the varying transition teams recognized the importance of buy-in
from the student body, as well as from faculty and staff.202
True to Bunting’s word, much of VMI was to stay the same. Its leaders were keen
on preserving the harshness of the adversative method; it was the abandonment of that
method and the development of a less aggressive style of leadership, many believed, that
had led the federal academies to go down the slippery slope into a “feel good” but less ef-
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fective military.203 Phyllis Schlafy, a member of the VMI Board of directors, wrote to VMI
alumni: “VMI Alumni, if you allow Ginsburg et al. to do to VMI what Pat Schroeder et al.
have done to the United States Navy, you are not the exemplars of manhood we thought
you were.”204
Accordingly, the same physical fitness test requirements would apply to VMI
women, in contrast to the federal service academies, which adjusted physical requirements
for females.205 Physical education requirements were also to remain the same, with the exception that female cadets would participate in boxing and wrestling separately, rather than
with the male cadets.206 A twice-a-week endurance test of ropes course, wall climbing, and
obstacle courses, known as the “rat challenge,” was kept the same except for the addition of
ramps at a few high obstacles.207
Small adjustments were made to the dress and appearance rules. Bunting initially
announced that women were to get the same “buzz cuts” as men,208 but after much back
and forth, women rats were left with an one-eighth-inch longer hair style than men.209 Men
and women would wear the same uniforms, except that the female uniforms were tailored.
Jewelry remained prohibited for rats, although after breakout, women could wear single
gold-post earrings (not more than one-eighth-inch in diameter) for occasions other than
parades, inspections, or athletics—an allowance that brought complaints from some male
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cadets, who wished to be able to do the same.210 “Conservative” cosmetics, including
“noneccentric lipstick” and colorless nail polish, were allowed for social occasions that
required more formal dress than the uniform worn in the classroom.211 The school issued
grey and white skirts to women for social engagements, but they were deemed so unattractive that most women did not wear them. A minor controversy occurred one year
when a woman began wearing one of the skirts to class, and was “boned” for improper
attire.212
Some concessions to women were defended explicitly on the ground that they were
necessary to make women’s experience as similar to men’s as possible. For example, female exchange students were recruited from Norwich Academy and Texas A&M to provide dykes to mentor the new female rats.213 Some changes were clearly for the benefit of
the men and the school itself. Female cadets who looked like men created some awkward
public relations moments for the school, including women being mistaken for men at public ceremonies and being ejected from public restrooms.214 There was also concern that too
masculine a look might attract the “wrong sort of women” to VMI.215 On some matters,
other forces intervened. For example, at one point the Department of Defense suggested
that giving women the same buzz cuts as men might constitute institutional harassment and
that it would consider threatening VMI’s ROTC program if it did so.216
The VMI administration also made some adjustments for women in the barracks.
Female cadets would live in the barracks, without locks on the doors, but shades were
added to the windows of all rooms—men’s and women’s—and could be pulled down
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when dressing.217 Women would have toilet stalls218 and individual showers,219 and their
arrival also inspired private examining rooms at the post hospital. Security lighting and
emergency call boxes would be installed around the post.220
Men benefited from some of these changes, in addition to the window shades and
the private examining rooms at the hospital. When administrators lengthened the length
of time for showers for female rats from thirty to ninety seconds to ten minutes supposedly for hygienic reasons, complaints of preferential treatment by male rats led to tenminute showers for them as well.221 As part of the negotiations over women’s swimwear,
men bargained for a more popular boxer-style suit, to replace the tight-fitting briefs that
previously had been required.222 In 1999, the first class (seniors) recommended a change
in breakout; instead of climbing the cold, muddy, steep hill, there would be a forced
march to New Market, followed by a re-enactment of the Civil War charge of their
predecessors. Some saw these and other changes as dilutions of the VMI experience, and
blamed them on the presence of women, even when the two were not related.223 Feeding
this resentment were continual grumblings in some quarters that women were afforded
preferential treatment.224
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One difficult matter concerned the gendered terminology at the school. In keeping with the intention to assimilate women—not change the institution—female first-year
students would be “brother rats.” Bunting ordered that terms like “dyke,” “bone,” and
“running a period” would stay.225 The administration neither official endorsed nor disapproved other familiar phrases, such as “raping your virgin ducks” (peeling apart the
stiffly starched legs of a new pair of white trousers) and the more recently coined “rolling
your hay tight as a tampon” (rolling up your thin mattress in the morning).226 Administrators made some effort to reduce the level of gendered vulgarities and obscenities that
had made the rat line a form of play-acting the raping and humiliation of women227 and at
one point sanded away the gender profanities etched in the wooden desks.228
Dating was forbidden of any rat, and upperclassmen were not allowed to date
anyone in their chain of command.229 In the first year of women’s presence at VMI, a
male and female cadet were disciplined for sexual contact. The student Executive Committee recommended suspension for both students, but the school administration reduced
the punishment to penalty tours and confinement to barracks. Later in the year, a couple
was expelled for a similar offense.230 Pregnancy was also an issue. Initially, the school
ordered that pregnancy would be cause for dismissal for both a pregnant cadet and a male
cadet who caused the pregnancy of another cadet.231 When the first woman cadet became
pregnant, however, pressure from DOJ and from women’s advocate groups—including
the National Women’s Law Center, who claimed that this approach would be unconstitutional—led to a new policy allowing pregnant cadets to remain in the corps as long as
their condition did not prohibit them from fulfilling their duties.232
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All cadets and staff had to attend workshops on sexual harassment and hazing, and
twenty cadets, staff, and faculty were trained to deal with complaints of sexual harassment.233 Some women believed that hostility decreased as time went on,234 but expressions
of hostility toward the women continued.235 In fact, some reported that negativity seemed
to increase after the first year, possibly because the effort to prime the student leadership to
accept responsibility for the successful integration of women could not be sustained year
after year at the same level of intensity.236 In the third year of coeducation, four women
left after Christmas break, one claiming that she experienced harassment, received a death
threat, and was harassed constantly about her weight.237 As women became upperclassmen, rats would sometimes ignore them or refuse to do push-ups when asked. One reported being told, “My dyke told me I don’t have to pay attention to women.”238
Everyone always understood that the entry of women could not succeed with only
a handful of women.239 Attracting enough women at VMI to have a “critical mass” has
been a challenge.240 As a result of extraordinary recruitment efforts,241 the school matriculated thirty or more women in the first two years of coeducation, including the upper-class transfers recruited from Norwich Academy and Texas A&M, but only twentyfour to twenty-eight women entered each of the following three classes.242 With increased recruitment efforts, however, female enrollment at VMI rose to forty-four in
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2003,243 just over fifty in 2005, and forty-seven in 2007.244 It appears, consistent with the
assimilation ideal, that these women were not crusaders seeking to change the institution
from within, but women who wanted the same physical and mental challenges as VMI
men.245
At the same time, enrollment in the VWIL program at Mary Baldwin College has
been consistently higher than that of female enrollment at VMI—sometimes more than
double. Since the program was started in 1995, at least forty-two cadets have entered
VWIL each year. In 2001, while twenty-four freshmen women matriculated at VMI,
fifty-two came to VWIL.246 In 2005, again, VWIL had twice the number of female cadets as VMI did.247
VWIL graduates are succeeding, by some measures more than the female graduates of VMI. For example, in May 2008, fourteen of the nineteen women who graduated
from the VWIL program were to be commissioned in the Air Force, Army, or Marine
Corps,248 a higher figure than the typical 40% figure averaged by VMI graduates, both
male and female.249 VWIL women are serving in the military with distinction.250 Virginia continues to support VWIL, even though the program did not serve its original purpose of saving VMI’s all-male status.251
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Such success might suggest that VWIL is, indeed, more compatible with women’s
style of learning and leadership than VMI. Some have gone further, suggesting that the
VWIL program is a better program not only for training women but men as well.252
VWIL’s successes, however, do not appear to have influenced the way VMI operates.
Given the seriousness with which VMI took the integration of women when required by
law to do so, one has to wonder how it would have responded to an order not only to admit women but to eliminate the ethos of male superiority at VMI.
V. Epilogue
On December 6, 2001, Judge Kiser entered an order that VMI had met all the obligations required by the federal courts in bringing women into the student body and the
case could now be closed.253 Bunting’s reaction to this order reflected both how much,
and how little, the case had achieved. He called the order “a vindication of many years of
dedication and hard work.” “We are pleased we were able to conclude this case,” he said
in a statement,” without compromising the institute’s core values.”254
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